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CONCLUSION
Three individuals approach the Rayburn House Office Building,
one of three buildings occupied by the United States House of Rep-
resentatives in Washington, D.C.1 All three are dressed in Muslim
burqas that cover the wearer’s entire body and place mesh grilles
over the eyes.2 Before reaching the security-screening checkpoint, all
three detonate explosives concealed under their religious garb, kill-
ing two Capitol Police Officers and eight visiting tourists. Identical
suicide bombings occur later that day at federal buildings in Florida
and Wisconsin.
1. Capitol Campus: Rayburn House Office Building, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL,
http://www.aoc.gov/cc/cobs/rhob.cfm (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
2. Nicole Atwill, France: Highlights of Parliamentary Report on Wearing of Burqa in
France, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc
_news?disp0_l205401815_searchD&8714992&0.
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Burqa-wearing individuals also execute attacks similar to those
perpetrated in 2008 in Mumbai, India, shooting civilians at Minne-
apolis’s Mall of America and outside the New York Stock Exchange.
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies quickly determine that
those responsible for the suicide attacks are Caucasian-American
adherents of now-deceased Anwar al-Awlaki.
In response to the wave of terrorist attacks by individuals conceal-
ing weapons and explosives under their burqas, bipartisan congres-
sional leadership from both chambers propose legislation similar to
a recent French law prohibiting individuals from wearing apparel that
conceals the face, including the burqa, in public places.3 Public out-
cry to the law’s seeming infringement upon religious free exercise is
immediately apparent both domestically and internationally.
Although the events just described have not yet occurred within
American borders, the hypothetical’s distressing tactic has already
been used to cause devastation in other regions of the world, most re-
cently against the American Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.4 In 2009,
male Taliban suicide bombers cloaked in “all-enveloping burqas” in-
filtrated Afghan government and security buildings, leading to twelve
deaths and twenty-two injuries.5 After engaging government security
forces, the suicide bombers returned fire using Kalashnikov assault
rifles concealed under their burqas.6 Other Taliban fighters who actu-
ally breached the buildings finally detonated explosive vests that were
hidden under their burqas.7 Similarly, in 2008, a male suicide bomber
in Iraq disguised in a woman’s abaya (similar to the burqa), came in-
credibly close to fulfilling his assassination attempt of Raad Tamimi,
the then-provincial governor of Iraq’s Diyala province.8 But for the
quick actions of Iraqi soldiers who fired on the terrorist as he ap-
proached their vehicle convoy, the bomber would have been able to
detonate his bomb in close proximity to the governor.9 Even though
3. See French ‘Burqa’ Ban Passes Last Legal Hurdle, FRANCE24.COM (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.france24.com/en/20101007-french-burqa-ban-passes-last-legal-hurdle
-constitutional-council-veil.
4. See, e.g., Jack Healy & Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Blames Pakistan-Based Group for
Attack on Embassy in Kabul, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09
/15/world/asia/us-blames-kabul-assault-on-pakistan-based-group.html?_r=1&pagewanted
=all (indicating that burqas may have been used by the Haqqani network, an al-Qaeda
ally, in attacks on the American Embassy in Kabul and NATO headquarters).
5. Kim Sengupta, The Burqa-Clad Bombers Who Terrorise Afghanistan, INDEPENDENT
(London), July 22, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asi/the-burqaclad-
bombers-terrorise-afghanistan-1755887.html.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Tina Susman, An Iraq Suicide Bomber Is a Man in Woman’s Garb, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2008, at A3.
9. See id.
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the governor was unharmed, the soldiers’ firing at the bomber none-
theless caused him to detonate his explosive vest, thereby killing
one and injuring nine civilians.10
This Note discusses the Free Exercise issues raised by hypo-
thetical public concealment legislation11 in the United States, with a
central focus on conflicts with religious free exercise under the First
Amendment. Before delving into the constitutional analysis, Part I
will provide the necessary background by, first, tracing the history of
the burqa as a religious practice; second, examining France’s rela-
tionship with the burqa and the burqa’s implications for women;
and third, providing a brief history of Islam in America. Part II will
establish the necessary standards for constitutional scrutiny of pub-
lic facial concealment legislation by, first, establishing the appli-
cable law of the Free Exercise Clause12 and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA);13 second, examining the cautionary case of
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeh; and third, dis-
cussing the government’s compelling interest in national security.
Part III provides the constitutional analysis by examining, first, poten-
tial burqa legislation through the Lukumi lens; second, the RFRA’s
substantial burden hurdle; and third, the potential arguments for the
government’s compelling interest. Under the governmental compelling
interest section, the discussion will turn to, first, the specificity of the
threat in question; second, the unviability of religious exemptions;
third, a non-legal threat analysis; fourth, parallel state anti-mask
laws; and fifth, a case study of Freeman v. Florida. Proceeding with
Part III, the discussion turns to, fourth, the RFRA’s second prong
requiring the government to use the least restrictive means. Within
the material detailing the RFRA’s second prong is an examination of
the scope of the proposed legislation and the final conclusion that
the legislation would indeed pass constitutional muster. Part IV
articulates the potential global consequences of the legislation be-
fore reaching the Note’s conclusion.
Americans rightly pride themselves on the core traditions of
religious tolerance and free exercise. Admittedly, the hypothetical
legislation in question would necessarily limit religious free exercise
for some. Nonetheless, delicate subjects which cause discomfort must
not dissuade forthright public debate. Ultimately, revered individual
10. Id.
11. Throughout this Note, I colloquially refer to the hypothetical legislation as “public
facial concealment legislation,” which would necessarily incorporate and proscribe all
means of concealment, including the burqa.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
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religious exercise must be reconciled with the government’s com-
pelling national security interest in the real-time physical safety of
its citizenry. This Note argues that considering our hypothetical,
the national security and public safety interests of the whole must
take precedence over individual free exercise, and that the proposed
hypothetical legislation would pass the necessary hurdles of the
RFRA analysis.14
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Burqa as a Religious Practice
The debate over the justifications of veiling Muslim women is
intriguing and controversial. Like in many religious debates, adher-
ents and scholars wrestle over interpretation and meaning of holy
texts.15 It is important initially to identify the terminology used in
scholarship surrounding the veiling debate. Unfortunately, many
writings use various classifications and veil types interchangeably,
thus creating confusion when moving between texts.
The etymology of the term “hijab”—meaning “curtain” or “sepa-
ration”—found in the Qur’an, is traceable to the word “hajaba,” mean-
ing “to hide from view.”16 While modern society may use “hijab” to
describe specific ways Muslim women may cover themselves (hair,
face, entire body, etc.), the term initially referred to the general
practice of covering women.17
People may be surprised that the practice of veiling predates
Islam, having been prominent in Syria and Iran as a status symbol.18
Scripturally, the Qur’an’s references to veiling established protocols
to adhere to when interacting with Muhammad’s wives. The Qur’an
states: “Believers, do not enter the Prophet’s house . . . unless asked.
And if you are invited . . . do not linger. And when you ask something
from the Prophet’s wives, do so from behind a hijab. This will assure
the purity of your hearts as well as theirs.”19
14. But see Christina A. Baker, French Headscarves and the U.S. Constitution:
Parents, Children, and Free Exercise of Religion, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 341, 355–56
(2007) (arguing that an RFRA analysis fails when examining an American head-scarf ban
in schools).
15. See BRONWYN WINTER, HIJAB & THE REPUBLIC: UNCOVERING THE FRENCH
HEADSCARF DEBATE 24–25 (2008).
16. See id. at 22 (stating the origins of the word “hijab”).
17. See id.
18. See REZA ASLAN, NO GOD BUT GOD: THE ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND FUTURE OF
ISLAM 65 (2005).
19. Id. (quoting AL-QUR’AN 33:53).
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Given the many visitors who called on and stayed near Muham-
mad, one of the primary purposes behind requiring such separation
was to secure and ensure the purity of Muhammad’s wives.20 Interest-
ingly, the only appearance in the Qur’an of the term “hijab” is in rela-
tion to the wives of Muhammad, not a broad pronouncement aimed
at all Muslim women.21 Scholars have concluded that, despite the
fact that the Qur’an does not overtly mandate the veiling of Muslim
women, female adherents likely began embracing the practice after
Muhammad’s death in order to emulate the Prophet’s wives.22 As for
when the veiling practice became mandatory for Muslim women,
Reza Aslan hypothesizes that Muslim scriptural and legal scholars
used their authority to assert their societal power and autonomy in
the face of Muhammad’s egalitarian reforms.23
Practicing Muslims seeking textual justification for the manda-
tory veiling of women may cite the following passage from the Qur’an:
“And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze
and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty
and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that
they should draw veils over their bosoms and not display their
beauty . . . .” 24 Another relevant passage states: “O Prophet, tell your
wives and your daughters and the women of the believers to draw
their cloaks close round them. That will be better, so that they may
be recognized and not annoyed. . . .” 25
To comply with the Qur’an’s supposed mandates, observant
Muslim females adhere to modest dress in a variety of ways. One
may don the “hijab,” which is a head-scarf covering the head and
neck, but leaving the face uncovered, the “niqab,” a facial veil leaving
only a small slit for the eyes, a waist-length “khimar” (resembling a
cape), which covers the hair, neck, and shoulders, or the most con-
servative option, the “burqa,” which covers the entire face and body,
leaving the wearer to look through a mesh screen.26 Muslim females
may ultimately choose to wear any of these coverings on account of
“personal religious conviction, freedom of religion, acceptance as a
good Muslim female, compliance with family values, neutralization
20. See id. at 65–66.
21. Id. at 66.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Aliah Abdo, Note, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the
Sociopolitical Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 441, 448 (2008) (emphasis added) (quoting AL-QUR’AN 24:31).
25. Id. at 449 (emphasis added) (quoting AL-QUR’AN 33:59).
26. Belgian Lawmakers Pass Burka Ban, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe
/8652861.stm (last updated Apr. 30, 2010).
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of sexuality and protection from harassment from Muslim males,
and individual choice and religious/cultural identity.” 27
B. France, the Burqa and Implications for Women
On October 11, 2010, France passed Act No. 2010-1192, “prohib-
iting the concealing of the face in public.” 28 Per the law’s command,
the legislation did not come into force until April 11, 2011 in order
to provide the authorities with sufficient time to educate the French
citizenry on the new prohibitions.29
Article 1 states that “[n]o one shall, in any public space, wear
clothing designed to conceal the face.” 30 The term “public space” is
statutorily defined as “composed of the public highway and premises
open to the public or used for the provision of a public service.” 31 The
French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs has further clarified
that “premises open to the public” are locations the public may freely
access, even if access is contingent upon payment of a fee.32 Violators
of the facial concealment law may be assessed a fine of up to €150
and/or required to attend a citizenship course.33 Despite the law’s ex-
pansive scope, Article 2, Section II provides that the aforementioned
proscriptions do not apply “if such clothing is prescribed or authorised
by legislative or regulatory provisions, is authorised to protect the
anonymity of the person concerned, is justified for health reasons or
on professional grounds, or is part of sporting, artistic or traditional
festivities or events.” 34 The French law therefore does not seek to
prohibit a patient’s necessary breathing apparatus, a construction
27. Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the
Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 743, 758
(2006).
28. Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans
l’espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010, Prohibiting the Concealment of the
Face in Public], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Oct. 12, 2010, translated in France Requires Faces to Remain Uncovered,
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE: LE GOUVERNEMENT, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf
/dissimultaion_visageENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2012)[hereinafter Law 2010-1192].
29. Population and Society: Law Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in Public,
FRANCE-DIPLOMATIE, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france/french-society/population
-and-society/article/law-prohibiting-the-concealment-of (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
30. Law 2010-1192, supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. Act N° 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in
Public: Frequently Asked Questions, RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE : LE GOUVERNEMENT, http://
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Q_A-ENG_2_.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
33. Molly Hofsommer, France’s Burqa Ban Passes Constitutional Muster, HUM. RTS.
BRIEF (Nov. 7, 2010), http://hrbrief.org/2010/11/france-burqa-ban-passes-constitutional
-muster/.
34. Law 2010-1192, supra note 28.
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foreman’s protective breathing mask, nor the statutorily mandated
safety helmet of a motorcyclist, all of which may obscure the iden-
tity of the wearer.35
In its ruling on October 7, 2010, the French Constitutional
Council held that the facial concealment legislation was constitu-
tional, albeit with one exception.36 While acknowledging the drafters’
response to the “danger to public security” from public facial conceal-
ment and their endeavor “to protect public order,” the Constitutional
Council held: “[T]he prohibition to cover one’s face in public places
could not, without violating article 10 of the 1789 Declaration, restrict
the exercise of religious freedom in places of worship opened to the
public . . . .” 37
In issuing its ruling, the French Council also seemed concerned
with the burqa’s perceived effects upon Muslim women. The final
ruling found that legislators believed “that women hiding their faces,
voluntarily or involuntarily, are placed in a situation of exclusion and
inferiority that is manifestly incompatible with the constitutional
principles of liberty and equality.” 38 Furthermore, before the French
ban was enacted, French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared, “[t]he
burqa is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience,” and “[w]e
cannot accept to have in our country women who are prisoners behind
netting, cut off from all social life, deprived of identity.” 39 In contrast,
American President Barack Obama used a major speech at Cairo
University to briefly address France’s burqa ban by stating: “[I]t is
important for Western countries to avoid impeding Muslim citizens
from practicing religion as they see fit—for instance, by dictating what
clothes a Muslim woman should wear. We can’t disguise hostility
towards any religion behind the pretence of liberalism.” 40
One critical response to President Sarkozy’s comments came
from Dr. Reefat Drabu, then–assistant secretary general of the
Muslim Council of Britain, who commented that “[i]t is patronising
and offensive to suggest that those Muslim women who wear the
burqa do so because of pressure or oppression by their male partners
35. See id. (providing examples of activities still permitted under the law).
36. Nicole Atwill, France: Law Prohibiting the Wearing of Clothing Concealing One’s
Face in Public Spaces Found Constitutional, GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Oct. 18, 2010),
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_1205402319_text.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Murray Wardrop, Muslim Leaders Condemn Sarkozy Over burqa Ban, TELEGRAPH
(London), June 24, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/5616629/Muslim-leaders
-condemn-Sarkozy-over-burqa-ban.html.
40. Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on a New
Beginning at Cairo University (June 4, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09.
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or guardians.” 41 Dr. Drabu, who spoke in his official capacity on behalf
of more than five hundred Muslim organizations across the United
Kingdom, accused President Sarkozy of “initiating a policy which is
set to create fear and misunderstanding and may lead to Islamophobic
reaction not just in France but in the rest of Europe too.” 42
While France’s motivations for passing the burqa law allegedly
included concern for Muslim women, the academic community is
greatly conflicted on veiling’s implications and effects. Some anthro-
pological studies emphasize that the burqa has represented tradi-
tional segregation between men and women and the view by some
that women should be relegated to the safe confines of purely do-
mestic matters.43 Yet, despite this apparent subjugation of Muslim
women, other perspectives offer a silver lining for women who wear
the burqa. To some Muslim women, the burqa empowers wearers to
venture out into public environments traditionally off-limits for some
Muslim women, while concurrently complying with an established
moral norm that women should not associate with unrelated men.44
Irrespective of our preconceived notions on veiling, some schol-
ars highlight the debate’s further nuances. For example, Columbia
University anthropology professor Lila Abu-Lughod states that she
clearly did not support the Taliban’s oppressive policies against Afghan
women or the idea that outside observers should embrace the defer-
ence of a cultural relativist.45 Rather, Abu-Lughod argues that West-
ern commentators on the burqa should cautiously consider whether
women abroad may have dissimilar motivations and perspectives on
justice.46 Additionally, Professors Kevin Ayotte and Mary Husain
assert the argument that drawing the broad inference that veiling
practices in Muslim countries represents “the universal oppression
of women” is to engage “in exactly the paternalistic logic that under-
lies the neocolonial politics of U.S. efforts to ‘liberate’ Afghan women
according to an explicitly Western model of liberal feminism.” 47
While this Note will focus primarily on the national security
interest behind public facial concealment legislation, social, moral,
41. Wardrop, supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. See Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological
Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others, 104 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 783, 785
(2002).
44. See id.
45. Id. at 787.
46. Id. at 787–88.
47. Kevin J. Ayotte & Mary E. Husain, Securing Afghan Women: Neocolonialism,
Epistemic Violence, and the Rhetoric of the Veil, 17 NAT’L WOMEN’S STUD. ASS’N J. 112,
117 (2005).
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and political issues concerning women—on which there is little con-
sensus—clearly factor into the debate as well.
C. America and Islam
The Muslim narrative in America is both extensive and, at times,
quite contentious. During the era of Christopher Columbus’s explo-
rations, Western and Northern African Muslims were conscripted
involuntarily as servants to voyaging Europeans.48 In Antebellum
America, most Muslims arrived as part of the slave trade from North
and West Africa.49 In fact, scholarship has revealed that African
Muslims played a central role in the slave trade as traffickers in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.50 Interestingly, during
their jihads against non-Muslims, some Muslims sold captured ene-
mies into American slavery while simultaneously expanding the reach
of Islam and challenging native West African religions.51
The number of Muslim immigrants in the United States dra-
matically increased in the mid-twentieth century on account of The
Immigration and Nationality Act of 196552 (INA).53 By removing a
quota system that limited the number of immigrants from Muslim-
majority countries to 100 individuals per year,54 the INA allowed in-
creased numbers of Muslims to begin new lives in the United States.
Bureau of Census figures reveal that “the number of immigrants
from Muslim-majority parts of the world rose from 134,615 in 1960 to
871,582 in 1990.” 55 Current analyses place the number of Muslims
currently living in the United States at seven million.56
While contemporary American public perception of Islam has
certainly been shaped by the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and
the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, American public opin-
ion in the early twentieth century was based on relatively pleasant
relations with Arab nations.57 Despite these initial halcyon days, the
48. KAMBIZ GHANEABASSIRI, A HISTORY OF ISLAM IN AMERICA: FROM THE NEW WORLD
TO THE NEW WORLD ORDER 10 (2010).
49. Id. at 15.
50. Id. at 17.
51. Id.
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1965).
53. GHANEABASSIRI, supra note 48, at 292–93.
54. Id. at 292.
55. Id. at 293.
56. About Islam and American Muslims, COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC REL., http://www
.cair.com/AboutIslam/IslamBasics.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2012).
57. Fawaz A. Gerges, Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America, 588 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 73, 74 (2003) (discussing how America’s lack of Middle Eastern
colonial expansion and bloody conflict allowed Arabs and Muslims to view the United
States as “progressive” compared to its European cousins).
372 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 18:363
United States after World War II became concerned with the rise of
active “secular Arab nationalism” and its threat to friendly “pro-
Western, conservative monarchies” that stood in opposition to Soviet
influence.58 Even in view of such concerns by American foreign policy
leaders, “American policy was driven by Cold War considerations and
strategic calculations, not by history, culture, or any intrinsic fear
or hatred of Islam.” 59
The Middle Eastern tumult of the 1970s changed American per-
ception. Events like the Yom Kippur War, the subsequent oil embargo
against the United States by OPEC (a consequence of American sup-
port for Israel), the Iranian revolution, and the American hostage
crisis with Iran were catalysts for the transformation of opinion that
held Islam as antithetical to American and Western interests.60 When
America found itself the target of terrorism in the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing, the resulting fatalities and destruction further es-
tablished the view of many Americans that “Muslims ‘are represen-
tative of a fanatic and terroristic culture that cannot be tolerated or
reasoned with.’ ” 61 Immediately after the 1993 bombing, a domestic
survey revealed that more than fifty percent of participants indicated
“that ‘Muslims are anti-Western and anti-American,’ ” 62 and when
asked to rate religious groups, respondents indicated Muslims as the
least favorable.63
In the time predating America’s founding, Islam and its adherents
had already reached our shores. Any discussion of America’s relation-
ship with its fellow Muslim citizens, and Muslims worldwide, must
unfortunately, but necessarily, acknowledge the existence of ignorant
strains of thought that uncritically equate Islam with terrorism. With
these intellectual hazards in mind, we move forward to examine
rationally the legal issues, while hopefully taking note of cultural,
political, and moral sensitivities.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY
To return to our hypothetical, in the wake of domestic terrorist
attacks carried out by burqa-clad men appropriating the most con-
servative dress of Muslim women, Congress has proposed legisla-
tion that would ban the wearing of the burqa in public places out of
concern for national security. Given the disputatious nature of the
58. Id. at 75.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 76.
61. Id. at 79 (citation omitted) (quoting Professor Richard Bulliet of Columbia University).
62. Id. (citation omitted).
63. Gerges, supra note 57, at 79.
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public facial concealment law and its likely subsequent legal chal-
lenges, analyses of the law’s constitutionality would no doubt be
conducted. This section will lay the groundwork and establish the
applicable law for such a constitutional analysis, limiting itself to
the Free Exercise Clause.
A. The Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA)
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution asserts: “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 64 The Supreme Court’s initial
exegesis of the free exercise clause occurred in Reynolds v. United
States.65 In Reynolds, the already-married plaintiff was convicted of
bigamy after marrying a second woman.66 At this time in American
history, Utah was referred to as the “Territory of Utah” and was gov-
erned by the Revised Statutes of the United States, a predecessor to
the United States Code.67 The plaintiff argued that his practice of
polygamy was a religious belief and/or duty compelled by his mem-
bership in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.68 The
plaintiff also tried to establish that Latter-Day Saints members found
scriptural support for polygamy in their sacred books and that he had
even received approval from elder church authorities to continue
his practice.69
Ultimately, the Court was faced with determining the contours
of the Free Exercise Clause’s guarantee for “genuine believers” like
the plaintiff in Reynolds.70 After exploring religious exercise predat-
ing the establishment of the Free Exercise Clause and analyzing the
Founders’ reluctance to establish a religious status quo, the Court held
that the plaintiff was not entitled to practice bigamy (in clear violation
of the statute), irrespective of his religious beliefs.71 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Waite stated that “[l]aws are made for the gov-
ernment of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere re-
ligious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” 72 Chief Justice
Waite expanded on his pronouncement by proposing hypotheticals
64. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
65. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
66. Id. at 145, 168.
67. Id. at 154.
68. Id. at 161.
69. Id. (asserting that textual sources stated male members who refused to practice
polygamy may be punished “and that the penalty for such failure and refusal would be
damnation in the life to come”).
70. Id. at 162.
71. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166–67.
72. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
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suggesting a world where individuals were free to act as they please,
so long as they claimed that they were doing so in furtherance of re-
ligious belief.73 Fearing the consequences of such unbridled liberty,
Chief Justice Waite commented that “the professed doctrines of reli-
gious belief ” would become “superior to the law of the land” and make
the individual citizen “a law unto himself.” 74
Today, the statutory authority for determining a law’s compliance
with the Free Exercise Clause is the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA).75 Passed in response to the Court’s decision in Employment
Division v. Smith,76 which abandoned the compelling interest test in
favor of the rational relationship test,77 the RFRA’s purpose was to re-
establish the compelling interest test as the standard when consider-
ing the suitability of governmental burdens on religious exercise.78
The RFRA asserts that “[g]overnment shall not substantially bur-
den a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability.” 79 The RFRA also states, however, that
the government “may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion” 80 when it can establish that the burden to the individual:
“(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest.” 81
B. A Cautionary Tale: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City
of Hialeah
Assuredly, the RFRA is the ruling statute that will determine
whether our hypothetical legislation encumbers religious free
73. Id. at 166–67.
74. Id. at 167.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006) (applying, after the case of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997), only to federal matters and not to the individual states).
76. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990)
(finding that the compelling interest test “contradict[ed] both constitutional tradition
and common sense”).
77. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993, H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 4 (1993)
(stating that the Smith “ ‘rational relationship test’ only requires that a law must be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest”).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1); RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993, S.
REP. NO. 103-111, at 2 (1993).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).
80. Id. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added). Disagreement exists about whether judges
may properly assess burdens to individual religious free exercise, but should rather focus
on institutions. See 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 206 (2006)
(arguing that the proper perspective for judicial review should be that of “religious en-
tities rather than individuals” because judges do not have the omniscience to assess
individual convictions and potential plaintiffs may be untruthful in professing personal
religious beliefs).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (emphasis added).
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exercise. Nonetheless, before examining the RFRA standards, the
government should heed the available warnings from the case of
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.82 Notably,
Lukumi was decided before the RFRA’s passage and was thus sub-
ject to a different standard. At the time of Lukumi, the free exercise
standard stated that if a law was demonstrated to be neutral and “of
general applicability,” then it need not pass strict scrutiny.83 Strict
scrutiny was reserved for those laws unable to demonstrate the afore-
mentioned twin qualities.84 Ultimately, the Court found that the city’s
law was neither neutral, nor of general applicability, and was there-
fore subject to strict scrutiny.85 The true lesson from Lukumi lies in
the Court’s determination of whether the city’s law was neutral and
of general applicability. For our purposes, any negative answer to
these inquiries is clearly detrimental to the government’s ability to
establish its compelling interest, and thus endangers the overall
case for constitutionality.
In Lukumi, the petitioners alleged violations of their rights under
the Free Exercise Clause, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and mon-
etary relief after the City of Hialeah, Florida, passed ordinances pro-
scribing the Church’s religious practices, specifically the practice of
animal sacrifice.86
As part of the Santeria religion, adherents believe that animal
sacrifice is one of the primary ways to foster personal relationships
with important spirits.87 After Santeria adherents took the initial
steps to establish a Santeria church in Hialeah, community members
became alarmed at the prospect of animal sacrifices, ultimately culmi-
nating in an emergency public session of the city council.88 As a result
of this session, the council passed several ordinances forbidding ani-
mal sacrifice based on the sentiment that the practice was antithetical
to “public health, safety, welfare and morals of the community.” 89
The Court first sought to determine whether the ordinances were
neutral. In evaluating petitioners’ challenge, the Court emphasized
that, irrespective of community members’ unease with the Church’s
religious practices, “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
82. 508 U.S. 520 (1993), superceded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).
83. Id. at 531.
84. Id. at 531–32.
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 528.
87. Id. at 524.
88. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 526.
89. Id. at 528.
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Amendment protection.” 90 In determining whether the purpose of
the ordinances was to suppress the Santeria religion or the practice
thereof, the Court looked initially to the text of the city’s provisions
to determine if it was facially discriminatory.91 After finding the text
did not demonstrate overt suppression, the Court proceeded to ex-
amine the adverse impact of the law.92 Importantly, the Court clar-
ified that adverse impact alone is not indicative of “impermissible
targeting” and further acknowledged that the government did pos-
sess “multiple concerns unrelated to religious animosity.” 93 The Court
ultimately found that the effect of the city’s ordinances fell dispro-
portionately on adherents of the Santeria religion.94 For example,
Ordinance 87-71 prohibited animal sacrifice, but “define[d] sacrifice
as ‘to unnecessarily kill . . . an animal in a public or private ritual or
ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption.’ ” 95 Thus,
under this ordinance, a citizen could unnecessarily kill an animal so
long as its purpose was not for religious rituals or ceremonies.
The Court also drew from Equal Protection analysis and looked
to legislative intent to determine the object and purpose of the city’s
ordinances. By examining the circumstances leading up to passage
of the ordinances,96 the Court easily concluded that the restrictions
on animal sacrifice were passed “ ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’
their suppression of Santeria religious practice.” 97 Namely, the pub-
lic record and audio tapes from the city council meetings revealed
the overt hostility of both council members and the public towards
the Santeria religion.98
The Court also found that the city ordinances failed to qualify as
laws of general applicability. While the City asserted the twin inter-
ests of public health and preventing animal cruelty, the Court noted
that the ordinances were under-inclusive, given that comparable non-
religious conduct implicating both such interests went unregulated.99
90. Id. at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. at 533–34.
92. Id. at 534 (“Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment
cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The
Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well
as overt.”).
93. Id. at 535.
94. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 535–36.
95. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id. at 540 (“Relevant evidence includes, among other things, the historical back-
ground of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enact-
ment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including
contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.”).
97. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. at 541.
99. Id. at 543.
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In reversing and holding for the Church, the Court concluded that
“[l]egislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed
to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices. The laws here in
question were enacted contrary to these constitutional principles,
and they are void.”100
Lukumi is an example of how simple statutory drafting and
legislative history can sink an otherwise facially neutral statute
passed in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.
Part III of this Note will further discuss Lukumi and apply its
parameters to the constitutional analysis of hypothetical public
facial concealment legislation.
C. The Government and Its Compelling Interest
To justify the alleged substantial burden that public facial con-
cealment legislation would impose, the government will need to per-
suasively argue that it possesses a compelling interest in the uniform
application of public facial concealment legislation. Unfortunately
for legislative and judicial observers, the RFRA does not clarify
what interest qualifies as “compelling.” In hindsight, it appears that
those whipping potential congressional votes deliberately left RFRA
terms unclear in order to preserve an already precarious voting bloc
alliance.101 Clarification of the compelling interest standard may be
found, however, in the congressional statement of purpose that sought
to re-establish orthodoxies articulated in Sherbert v. Verner102 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder,103 prior decisions of the Court.104 For example,
“Yoder subordinates religious liberty only to ‘interests of the highest
order,’ ” while Sherbert authorizes such subordination “only to avoid
‘the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests.’ ”105
Still, there are other perspectives that attempt to articulate
the compelling governmental interest standard. Professor Michael
McConnell has argued “that a believer has no license to invade the
private rights of others or to disturb public peace and order,”106
while Professor Stephen Pepper articulates the standard as: “[I]s
100. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 547.
101. Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 21 (1994).
102. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
103. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
104. Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 224 (1994).
105. Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406).
106. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1464 (1990).
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there a real, tangible (palpable, concrete, measurable) non-specula-
tive, non-trivial injury to a legitimate, substantial state interest[?]”107
Congress also stated that, in order to prove its compelling
interest, the government “must do more than simply offer conclusory
statements that a limitation on religious freedom is required for
security, health [or] safety.”108 Furthermore, the Court has declared
that hypothetical fears will not be sufficient to properly articulate
a compelling interest.109 For example, in Yoder, Wisconsin asserted
that its interest in a compulsory education system for children was
so compelling that it ultimately trumped the religious considerations
of the state’s separatist Amish.110 Wisconsin also argued that, if
children were not compelled to obey state law mandating school
attendance until the age of sixteen, any child who subsequently left
the community would “not be in the position of making their way in
the world without the education available in the one or two addi-
tional years the State requires.”111
The Court acknowledged Wisconsin’s basic “duty to protect chil-
dren from ignorance.”112 However, due to a lack of tangible evidence
that Amish children, who “possess[ed] such valuable vocational skills
and habits [were] doomed to become burdens on society should they
determine to leave the Amish faith,”113 the Court rejected such omi-
nous assumptions and ruled for the Amish defendant.114
Additionally, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
Do Vegetal, the Court ruled against the Government on the grounds
that it failed to articulate a compelling interest in the uniform ap-
plication of the Controlled Substances Act (“The Act”) to justify the
significant burden placed on the respondent church.115 In Gonzales,
the respondent was a small American sect of the Brazilian-based
Christian Spiritist religion, O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal (UDV).116 The government fully acknowledged117 that a central
107. GREENAWALT, supra note 80, at 216 (alternation in original) (quoting Stephen L.
Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause—Some Reflections on Recent Cases,
9 N. KY. L. REV. 265, 289 (1982)).
108. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993, S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 10 (1993)
(emphasis added).
109. Laycock & Thomas, supra note 104, at 225.
110. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
111. Id. at 224.
112. Id. at 222.
113. Id. at 225.
114. Id.
115. 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006).
116. Id. at 425.
117. Id. at 428 (“[T]he Government conceded the UDV’s prima facie case under
RFRA. . . . [A]pplication of the Controlled Substances Act would (1) substantially burden
(2) a sincere (3) religious exercise[.]”).
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practice of the UDV religion involved taking communion with the sac-
ramental tea “hoasca,” containing plants carrying dimethyltryptamine
(DMT), a hallucinogen proscribed by the Act.118 UDV sought relief
under the RFRA119 by filing a declaratory judgment and injunction
against the Attorney General, arguing that applying the Act to UDV’s
practice of ingesting hoasca was a violation of the RFRA.120
The government argued that, despite the genuine belief that
hoasca ingestion was necessary to religious observance, the Act did not
allow for the individualized exemptions that the UDV requested.121
Despite the government’s argument, the Court emphasized the exact-
ing inquiry essential to the RFRA, stating that the “RFRA requires
the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is
satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—
the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being
substantially burdened.”122 Importantly, the Court reiterated that
while the government may indeed possess an interest of the utmost
importance, the government must nonetheless “show with more par-
ticularity how its admittedly strong interest . . . would be adversely
affected by granting an exemption.”123
The Court did not ultimately accept the government’s position
that varying application of The Act would seriously “undercut” the
law’s effectiveness.124 By portraying the government position as
essentially “if I make an exception for you, I’ll have to make one for
everybody,”125 the Court articulated two points for consideration:
1) sizeable exemptions were already made for Native Americans’ use
of peyote,126 a substance with an identical classification under The
Act; and 2) the RFRA’s drafters envisioned exemptions to “rule[s] of
general applicability,” such as The Act.127
118. Id. at 425.
119. See id. at 424 n.1 (stating the RFRA only applies to the Federal Government
because of a previous Court decision holding that any application to the States would
surpass Congressional authority).
120. Id. at 425.
121. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 430 (indicating that the Government argued that the
Act “cannot function with its necessary rigor and comprehensiveness if subjected to
judicial exemptions”).
122. Id. at 430–31 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2006)). Note that
the text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 proscribes Government from burdening the individual
person’s exercise of religion, even with “rule[s] of general applicability.” Id. at 436.
123. Id. at 431 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
124. Id. at 435 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. at 421 (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 433.
127. Gonzales. 546 U.S. at 436 (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
380 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 18:363
Importantly, the Court did, however, recognize that the govern-
ment may sometimes possess legitimate interests that do not allow
for individual exemptions.128 The Court cited United States v. Lee129
to illustrate such an instance.130 In Lee, a proposed exemption for a
religious belief that precluded followers from paying Social Security
taxes was dismissed.131 In ruling against the exemption, the Court
in Lee held that “mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal
vitality of the social security system.”132 Despite the government’s
attempt to analogize its purported legitimate interest to that found
in Lee, the Gonzales Court did not view a UDV exemption to The Act
as unreasonable.133 Furthermore, the Court refused to equate any
UDV exemption with the considerable systemic harm that the Court
recognized in Lee.134
While the Lukumi factors may seem benign when compared to
the RFRA’s formal mandates, legislative drafters must necessarily
heed the lessons learned with the knowledge that a reviewing court
may utilize the factors when determining a law’s constitutionality.
The RFRA has clarified that the government may substantially bur-
den an individual’s religious exercise so long as it can establish that
the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest,
and that the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
interest is utilized.
III. ANALYSIS
Part III will apply the above constitutional framework to hypo-
thetical public facial concealment legislation, beginning with an
analysis of the Lukumi case and its instructions regarding statutory
drafting of laws that potentially infringe upon free exercise, and
proceeding with an analysis of public facial concealment legislation
under the RFRA.
A. A Word of Caution to Legislators: Lukumi
Pursuant to the holding in Lukumi, in assessing the constitu-
tionality of public facial concealment legislation, it is imperative first
to determine whether the legislation is neutral by examining the
128. Id. at 435.
129. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
130. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 435.
131. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260.
132. Id. at 258.
133. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 436–37.
134. Id. at 437.
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text of the statute. If legislators crafted language specifically enumer-
ating the burqa as forbidden, the legislation would not clear Lukumi’s
hurdle proscribing the restriction of practices because of religious be-
liefs or practices.135 Opponents of the legislation would likely argue the
legislation is discriminatory given that facial coverings for religious
reasons are prohibited, whereas coverings for secular reasons are
exempt.136 Any carefully drafted statute would thus need to refrain
from using facially discriminatory language by stating something
comparable to: “All facial coverings and impediments to ascertaining
the identity of an individual in public are hereby prohibited.”
The Lukumi decision also obliges legislators to consider the
real effect of the law.137 As articulated in Lukumi, however, the ex-
istence of adverse impact does not necessarily imply impermissible
targeting.138 Public facial concealment legislation would surely
impact some Muslim women who either choose or feel compelled
to wear the burqa. Lukumi, however, reminds us that the govern-
ment may indeed have legitimate concerns that transcend religious
animosity.139 Far from solely affecting Muslim women, the proposed
legislation would proscribe the public wearing of ski masks, bala-
clavas, or stockings, to achieve the legitimate object of public safety
and national security.
Borrowing from the Lukumi neutrality analysis, legislative and/or
administrative history would yield valuable information for a review-
ing court.140 House and Senate committee transcripts including con-
temporaneous statements by members of Congress emphasizing the
dangers posed by Muslims wearing burqas would likely fail the test
for a neutral objective. Moreover, the Court would examine the his-
tory and sequence of events leading up to the provision’s enactment.
Admittedly, this analysis would be a hurdle for the public facial
concealment legislation.
In our hypothetical, those wearing burqas perpetrated the series
of terrorist attacks. Thus, despite the statute’s facial neutrality, events
preceding the legislation paint the legislation as largely reactionary.
Although legislative and/or administrative history may indeed help
an opponent’s critique of the legislation’s object, to carry this inves-
tigatory tactic to its logical conclusion seems naive and detrimental
to legitimate governmental interests. Under this reasoning, if the
government suffers harm or loss on account of a religious practice,
135. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993).
136. See id. at 537 (identifying a requirement for facial neutrality).
137. Id. at 535.
138. Id. at 531.
139. See id. at 529–30.
140. Id. at 540.
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it subsequently would not be allowed to proscribe conduct related to
the religious practice. Furthermore, the hypothetical legislation was
not enacted in response to legitimate religious exercise, but rather
the exploitation of religious garb for nefarious purposes.
Along with determining neutrality, a reviewing court would
seek to determine whether the legislation was a law of general ap-
plicability. With the public facial concealment legislation, the gov-
ernment’s asserted interests are, generally, national security, and,
specifically, the need to identify individuals quickly and positively
and to safeguard public spaces. Unlike the ordinance in Lukumi, our
hypothetical legislation is not under-inclusive in that it also pro-
scribes nonreligious garb that obstructs the wearer’s facial identity.
Therefore, the government’s interests are not achieved by solely im-
posing burdens on religious conduct, but also by burdening and in-
conveniencing secular conduct.
Considering these perceived weaknesses in arguments support-
ing the legislation, the situation contains a further nuance. Unlike
the council acting in Lukumi, Congress would not be making value
judgments with respect to whether the burqa is “acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible.”141 Rather, the statute’s aim would be
to foil efforts by extremist individuals to exploit the burqa and harm
American citizens. Nonetheless, even if the proposed legislative lan-
guage were to pass the initial hurdle of facial neutrality consistent
with the standards for statutory drafting and legislative intent in
Lukumi, it is by no means the end of the inquiry.
B. RFRA Framework: RFRA’s Substantial Burden Hurdle
The RFRA states that “[g]overnment may substantially burden
a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person . . . is in furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest; and . . . is the least restrictive means of further-
ing that compelling governmental interest.”142
While the Gonzales Court found that the government had not
sufficiently articulated a compelling interest,143 there are distinct
factors in our hypothetical that may buttress the public facial con-
cealment legislation. First, the government in Gonzales did not con-
test the UDV’s prima facie RFRA case that enforcing “the Controlled
141. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2006).
143. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
439 (2006).
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Substances Act would (1) substantially burden (2) a sincere (3) re-
ligious exercise.”144
Although the proposed public facial concealment legislation
would potentially inconvenience and burden Muslim women, the
government may argue that the ban does not substantially burden
a Muslim woman’s religious exercise. Much like the French burqa
ban legislation, under the proposed hypothetical legislation, burqas
may still be worn in houses of worship and in the privacy of the
home. The only sphere that would proscribe the burqa is that of the
public. In fact, the proposed legislation is much more accommodat-
ing compared to that sought by the government in Gonzales, in
which the government asserted that there were no situations in
which hallucinogen-containing hoasca was acceptable for use.145
Second, the government may argue that unlike the UDV’s in-
gestion of hoasca in Gonzales, the wearing of a burqa is not a religious
practice, but a nonobligatory, cultural choice, and thus not protected
under the RFRA.146 For example, French President Nicolas Sarkozy
has asserted that “[t]he burqa is not a religious sign,” but actually
represents “a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement.”147 Rector
of the Paris Mosque, Dalil Boubakeur, went further, saying that
“neither the burqa, nor the niqab, nor any all-over veil, are religious
prescriptions of Islam,”148 while Mohammed Moussaoui, head of the
government-sponsored French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM),
has said that “no Koranic text prescribes the wearing of the burqa
or niqab.”149 Nonetheless, the government would be wise not to ad-
vance this argument because the Court has stated on numerous
occasions that it will not venture into determining the validity and
genuineness of religious convictions.150
Finally, although a statute may substantially burden individual
free exercise rights, it may redeem itself if it furthers a compelling
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest. The next two sections will analyze the hypothetical
legislation on those two prongs.
144. Id. at 428.
145. Id. at 419.
146. See supra note 21–22 and accompanying text.
147. France’s Ban on the Burqa: The War of French Dressing, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/15270861/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Women and Veils: Running for Cover, ECONOMIST, May 13, 2010, http://www
.economist.com/node/16113091 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (alteration in original) (“It
is not within ‘the judicial function and judicial competence,’ however, to determine
whether appellee or the Government has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith;
‘[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.’ ” (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Ind. Employ’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981))).
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C. RFRA Framework: Compelling Governmental Interest
Additionally, in considering the constitutionality of public facial
concealment legislation, the Court would no doubt consider the gov-
ernment’s assertion of a compelling interest in support of the pro-
posed law, consistent with the test codified by the RFRA. First and
foremost, the government would highlight its compelling interest in
furthering national security.151 The government would emphasize the
need for law enforcement to identify persons and monitor erratic be-
havior in public spaces quickly, especially given the nature of the
hypothetical’s terrorist attacks.
1. Specificity of the Threat
With the proposed legislation, the government would not simply
assert the broad mantle of national security as a compelling interest.152
The government “must do more than simply offer conclusory state-
ments that a limitation on religious freedom is required for security,
health [or] safety.”153 Considering the Court’s pronouncement, the
government must forcefully argue that in the wake of audacious ter-
rorist attacks, it faces not an abstract threat, but specific, identifiable
danger in the form of public facial concealment. Preventing the com-
mission of further terrorist attacks by the deft misuse of burqas and
other religious garb is exactly the type of interest representing “the
highest order”154 and also an attempt to avoid “the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests.”155
Considering that our hypothetical involves the abuse of the burqa
in perpetrating terrorist attacks, the government could justifiably
argue that it has a specific compelling interest in maintaining public
safety through being able to quickly and positively identify individu-
als in the public sphere. One need only perform a cursory internet
search to find numerous international terrorist attacks, often ex-
ploiting the anonymity of the burqa, that target public spaces.156
151. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“It is ‘obvious and unarguable’
that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”
(quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964))).
152. See, e.g., id. (explaining that “national security” is the highest of government
interests).
153. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT OF 1993, S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 10 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
155. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. See, e.g., Rob Crilly, Burka-Clad Female Suicide Bomber Detonates in Pakistan,
TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 11, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia
/pakistan/8694814/Burka-clad-female-suicide-bomber-detonates-in-Pakistan.html
(detailing a suicide bombing by a burqa-clad woman at the scene of an earlier bombing,
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Terrorist groups have also used the burqa in attempts to move free-
ly in public and cross international borders.157 Given the strong po-
tential for future targeting of public spaces, the public’s dependence
on such spaces, and the increasing use of burqas to facilitate these
attacks, the government must argue that their interest in ensuring
the safety and stability of such spaces is indeed compelling.
2. Unviability of Religious Exemptions
As is evident from Gonzales, the Court has recognized that the
RFRA was designed to consider religious exemptions in cases of bur-
dening religious exercise.158 While acknowledging the unprecedented
nature of this hypothetical legislation, in order to advance the par-
amount compelling interest of national security, the law must be
enforced uniformly.
Thanks to Gonzales, the government knows it must demon-
strate “with more particularity how its” compelling interest would be
jeopardized by any potential exemption.159 With our hypothetical
legislation, the government’s compelling interest is in allowing law en-
forcement to make real-time threat assessments, thwarting additional
terrorist attacks, and securing public spaces and, in a broader sense,
national security. Alas, when courts begin making individual exemp-
tions, they have effectively negated the government’s compelling
interests. Rather than simply making an exemption for law-abiding
citizens, the Court has just allowed a means of facial concealment
to move freely about public places with next to absolute anonymity,
thereby eliminating any security initially gained. Surely, if RFRA
leaving at least seven people dead); Declan Walsh, Taliban Use Girl, 8, as Bomb Mule in
Attack on Afghanistan Police Post, GUARDIAN (London) (June 26, 2011), http://www
.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/26/afghanistan-taliban-girl-bomb-police (detailing attack
by two burqa-clad Pakistani Taliban terrorists, ultimately leaving 10 people dead);
Female Suicide Bomber Targets US Forces, Kills Afghan Translator, MONSTERS &
CRITICS (June 4, 2011, 2:25 PM), http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/southasia/news
/article_1643502.php/Female-suicide-bomber-targets-US-forces-kills-Afghan-translator
(detailing suicide bombing on an American military convoy by a burqa-clad female).
157. See, e.g., Afghan Police Detain Seven Burqa-Clad Insurgents, TIMES OF INDIA,
July 4, 2011, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/Afghan-police-detain
-seven-burqa-clad-insurgents/articleshow/9099450.cms (detailing an arrest by Afghan
police of seven armed men, all disguised in burqas); Al-Qaeda Militant Leader Captured
Dressed as Woman, USA TODAY, June 28, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world
/afghanistan/2011-06-28-Afghanistan-captured-leader-al-qaida_n.htm (detailing the arrest
of a senior leader from an al-Qaeda–linked terrorist group, disguised in a burqa).
158. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
434 (2006) (“RFRA makes clear that it is the obligation of the courts to consider whether
exceptions are required under the test set forth by Congress.”).
159. See id. at 431 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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exemptions are recognized for some, terrorist operatives may still
disguise themselves as exempt individuals, thereby exploiting the
RFRA’s provisions and potentially executing further attacks.
In this instance, the government is not advancing the faulty
argument it did in Gonzales that granting one exemption would
require exemptions for all.160 Rather, it is the concealing nature of
the burqa that makes it a unique threat to the public safety and
national security interests thus mentioned.
Despite any desire by the government to grant individual
exemptions to law-abiding citizens, the proposed public facial con-
cealment legislation would effectively become impotent if subjected
to numerous exemptions. Although this assertion doomed the gov-
ernment in Gonzales,161 here, the government could confidently
assert that the unique nature of the burqa, coupled with its critical
compelling interest, places the legislation beyond the reach of ju-
dicial exemptions.
3. Threat Analysis
Drawing from non-legal disciplines is helpful when analyzing
the magnitude and nature of the threat of terrorist attacks using the
burqa. National security professionals analyzing potential threats to
the United States may use the following model: first, ascertain the
nature of the threat and, second, determine whether the threat is
real or perceived.162 Third, it is imperative to determine exactly when
the threat will be executed.163
According to Amos Guiora, the four types of threat classifications
are imminent, foreseeable, long-range, and uncertain.164 Imminent
threats are classified as those to be executed shortly,165 such as in-
formation from a human intelligence source that a pipe bomb will be
detonated at Yankee Stadium during game one of the World Series.
Foreseeable threats are threats that will materialize within one year,
like the threat that domestic militia groups will attack federal court-
houses in the very near future.166 Guiora classifies long-range threats
as threats that have an undetermined execution time, like al-Qaeda
operatives within the country with no specified mission.167 Lastly,
160. Id. at 421.
161. Id.
162. AMOS N. GUIORA, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION: RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
96 (2009).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 96–97.
165. Id. at 96.
166. Id. at 97.
167. Id.
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uncertain threats are those threats “that invoke general fears of
insecurity,”168 like al-Qaeda’s targeting elected officials in the United
Kingdom,169 which have created similar fears within American law
enforcement and intelligence communities.170
The nature of the threat discussed in this Note consists of ter-
rorists seeking to wear the burqa not for religious observation, but
rather to conceal their identity and carry out devastating attacks.
Although this phenomenon has yet to be employed domestically, the
threat of such attacks is quite real and far from imaginary. The im-
minence of further attacks by individuals exploiting the burqa is fore-
seeable, given the tactic’s increasing popularity amongst terrorists.171
As for a real-time assessment, the nature of the threat remains
at an uncertain level. The difficulty with real-time analysis lies in
the lack of specific threats, and thus, the threat remains uncertain.
Any prohibition on public facial concealment today would be pre-
emptive. Yet, working within the confines of the hypothetical, any
subsequent legislation would be justified by pointing to the nature
of the continuing threat.
Irrespective of the threat’s perceived status and imminence,
terrorists are continually probing our national security resources for
weakness. For example, prior to the tragic events of September 11,
2001, al-Qaeda hijackers trained extensively in the United States,
with particular terrorist operatives taking cross-country surveillance
flights.172 During one such surveillance flight, the tactical leader of
the 9/11 plot, Mohammed Atta, was able to determine that hijackers
would likely face no difficulty in carrying box cutters onto flights
and pinpointing the optimal time to storm a cockpit.173 Recent foiled
terror plots to detonate explosives concealed in printer cartridges
bound for the United States have revealed al Qaeda affiliates in
Yemen likely conducted initial shipments of innocuous materials to
serve as “dry run[s]” before the actual attack.174 Similarly, terrorist
operatives seeking to exploit the advantages of wearing a burqa would
likely probe the security of public spaces to determine optimal targets.
168. GUIORA, supra note 162, at 97.
169. Oliver Holmes, Foreigners and Locals in the Crosshairs of Yemen’s al-Qaedas,
TIME, Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2024430,00.html.
170. US Issues Travel Alert for Americans in Europe, BBC (Oct. 3, 2010, 1:52 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11460335.
171. Walsh, supra note 156.
172. THE NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 242 (2004) (describing how hijackers Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah took cross-country
surveillance flights in the summer of 2001).
173. Id. at 245.
174. Parcel Bomb Plotters ‘ Used Dry Run’, Say US Officials, BBC (Nov. 2, 2010,
6:22 AM ), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11671377.
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Whereas undoubtedly different from traditional legal analysis,
non-legal frameworks can be instructive tools for assessing the mag-
nitude of a potential threat and establishing the compelling govern-
mental interest.
4. Parallel State Laws
The matter of compelling government interest in national secu-
rity has been discussed in legislation and scholarship focusing on state
anti-mask bans. For example, the Virginia Code forbids any public
covering of the face by an individual over sixteen years old with the in-
tent to conceal the wearer’s identity.175 It also prohibits face covering
on another’s private property without first obtaining the written con-
sent of the owner or tenant.176 The statute enumerates exemptions for
face coverings involved in wearing holiday costumes, those engaged
in employment requiring protective gear, individuals involved in a
“theatrical production or masquerade ball,” or those who cover their
faces “for bona fide medical reasons.”177 While Virginia’s highest court
may have either performed an analytical blunder or simply punted on
this statute’s implications for religious garb such as the burqa,178 the
Court justified the statute in that it aims to “prevent[ ] . . . violence,
crime and disorder by the unmasking of potential criminals.”179
Similarly, California has proscribed the wearing of a “mask . . .
for the purpose of: One—Evading or escaping discovery, recognition,
or identification in the commission of any public offense. Two—
Concealment, flight, or escape, when charged with, arrested for, or
convicted of, any public offense.”180 As many anti-mask statutes have
their origin in combating crime and terror at the hands of the nefari-
ous Ku Klux Klan,181 and are inapposite to most Muslims’ motivations
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-422 (West 2011) (“It shall be unlawful for any person over
sixteen years of age while wearing any mask, hood or other device whereby a substantial
portion of the face is hidden or covered so as to conceal the identity of the wearer, to be
or appear in any public place . . . .” (emphasis added)).
176. Id. (proscribing facial coverings to be worn on “any private property in this
Commonwealth without first having obtained from the owner or tenant thereof consent
to do so in writing”).
177. Id.
178. Hernandez v. Virginia, 406 S.E.2d 398, 399–400 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (taking the
questionable step of dismissing an argument that the statute would prevent “Muslim
women from wearing traditional outfits covering their faces” by asserting that the statute
is only violated when she intends to conceal her identity (burqa-wearing Muslims pre-
sumably wear such garb for exactly that reason), and thus, wearing for religious practice
is not prohibited).
179. Id. at 401.
180. CAL. PENAL CODE § 185 (West 2011).
181. See Hernandez, 406 S.E.2d at 401 (acknowledging that the anti-mask statute was
initially written to “unmask the Klan” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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for wearing the burqa, these statutes nonetheless share legitimate
justifications and compelling governmental interests in preventing
misconduct and quickly and positively identifying individuals.
5. Case Study: Freeman v. Florida
Just as state legislatures have acknowledged the importance of
the national security interests in their anti-mask laws, a state su-
preme court has ruled in favor of the government in an RFRA-like
inquiry on grounds of public safety and security.
A case using a similar analytical framework to the federal RFRA
statute is the illuminating Florida case of Freeman v. Florida.182 In
Freeman, the plaintiff, Sultaana Lakiana Myke Freeman (Freeman),
appealed the revocation of her Florida driver’s license on the grounds
that such action violated Florida’s Religious Restoration Act of 1998
(“The FL RFRA”).183 Controversy arose when Freeman refused to have
an identification picture taken without a niqab that covered her en-
tire face, thereby violating Florida statutes requiring that said pic-
ture be “a fullface photograph.”184
Freeman’s primary claim was that such a revocation violated
the FL RFRA, which happened to closely parallel the federal RFRA
statute.185 Though the Florida Circuit Court recognized that Freeman
wore the niqab on account of her religious convictions, it ultimately
found that the Florida statute requiring Freeman to momentarily lift
her niqab for a photograph did not constitute a “substantial burden”
to her exercise of religion.186 Freeman could not meet the requirement
of “substantial burden,” and, thus, the court had no need to analyze
the photograph requirement under the FL RFRA .187 Nonetheless,
because Freeman’s claim involved the free exercise of religion, the
court proceeded to determine whether Florida had “a compelling
state interest” in taking Freeman’s photograph unobstructed.188
The court ultimately answered their inquiry in the affirmative
by finding that requiring a full-face photograph did indeed constitute
a compelling state interest on grounds of promoting public safety and
182. Freeman v. Florida, No. 2002-CA-2828, 2003 WL 21338619, at *7 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
June 6, 2003).
183. Id. at *1.
184. Id. at *2–3.
185. Id. at *1–2 (allowing, like the federal RFRA, the Government to “substantially
burden . . . [the] exercise of religion” when it demonstrated that application of burden
to the person: 1) was “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and” 2) was
“the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest”).
186. Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. Id. at *2–3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *3–4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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security.189 The State highlighted the correlation between Florida’s
identification requirement and public safety by calling a senior law
enforcement official to testify about the vital need to quickly ascertain
identities.190 The law enforcement official also emphasized that a full-
face photograph is central to criminal and intelligence professionals
in identifying potential suspects.191
The most interesting section of the opinion relates to the central
issue discussed in this Note. Acknowledging that the State has a com-
pelling interest in public safety and security in “accurately and swiftly
determin[ing] identities,” the court underscored that the international
climate has changed in the past twenty to twenty-five years.192
Although the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff herself most
likely poses no threat to national security, there likely are people
who would be willing to use a ruling permitting the wearing of
fullface cloaks in driver’s license photos by pretending to ascribe
to religious beliefs in order to carry out activities that would
threaten lives.193
Moreover, the court recognized that Florida had allowed for ob-
servant Muslim women with similar beliefs about veiling to have
full-face photographs taken in an enclosed private room by a female
state employee.194 With this type of accommodation, the female in
question would never have to display the photograph depicting her
face, absent situations that involved law enforcement officials.195 In
weighing the various interests, the court stated, the “[p]laintiff ’s veil-
ing practices must be subordinated to society’s need to identify people
as quickly as possible in situations in which safety and security of
others could be at risk.”196
When validating a law under the RFRA, the government must
establish a compelling interest. As discussed in this section, the great
specificity of the threat from public concealment makes religious
exemptions pragmatically implausible. Furthermore, engaging in a
brief non-legal threat analysis helps further clarify the threat behind
the government’s compelling interest. A brief analysis of state anti-
mask bans reveals the shared justifications with our public facial
189. Id. at *8.
190. Id. at *4.
191. Id.
192. Id. at *7 (citing new threats to public safety, including foreign and domestic
terrorism).
193. Id.
194. Freeman, 2003 WL 21338619, at *3.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
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concealment legislation. In conclusion, the Florida case of Freeman
provides us with a prime example of individual religious exercise
being subordinated to the state’s compelling interest in national
security and public safety. The next section will briefly discuss the
least restrictive means prong of the RFRA framework.
D. RFRA Framework: Least Restrictive Means
The second RFRA prong requiring the government to use the
least restrictive means is a difficult hurdle to clear.197 In fact, the
Court has been candid in observing that “[c]laims that a law substan-
tially burdens someone’s exercise of religion will often be difficult to
contest.”198 Still, the inquiry must focus on the scope of the legislation.
1. Scope of Proposed Legislation
Much like its French counterpart, the proposed legislation
would forbid any concealment of the face while in public. As previ-
ously addressed, opponents of this legislation will argue that its scope
greatly interferes with female Muslims and their ability to freely
practice their religion. An initial analysis of the legislation may
seem to validate this point, but a closer examination of its impact
reveals an array of situations in which the burqa, as a religious
practice, may flourish.
Under our hypothetical legislation, Muslim women are free to
wear the burqa in private. The government has no conceivable com-
pelling interest in regulating the wearing of burqas in the privacy of
one’s own home. When at home, the burqa-clad woman’s anonymity
does not pose an immediate threat to other members of the public.
Moreover, the legislation would allow women to wear burqas in
Mosques and other houses of worship that grant such permission.
This is yet another example of the legislation’s seeking to balance
the government’s compelling interest with the citizen’s interest in
allowing robust religious practice.
As demonstrated, the hypothetical public facial concealment leg-
islation must go through a rigorous analysis under the RFRA. Before
reaching the RFRA’s two-pronged analysis, the government should
make the legitimate argument that the RFRA is not even triggered
due to the lack of a true substantial burden on religious free exercise.
The government should then articulate its paramount compelling
197. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (stating that requiring the
Government to show both a compelling interest and that it has used the least restricting
means available “is the most demanding test known to constitutional law”).
198. See id. (articulating the difficult standard the government must meet).
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interest in making real-time threat assessments of individuals,
securing public spaces, and general national security. Furthermore,
the government should emphatically argue that the legislation be
enforced uniformly so as not to undermine the compelling interest,
namely, counterterrorism interests. Whereas the RFRA’s demanding
standards are difficult to overcome, the government should argue that,
given the scope of the hypothetical legislation, it still satisfies the least
restrictive means prong. Given the hypothetical confines of this Note
and the recommended legislation and government arguments, when
analyzed under the RFRA, the legislation constitutionally comports
with religious free exercise.
Opponents of this legislation would likely argue that the burden
is indeed significant, and furthermore, that it would force some pious
Muslim women to choose between religious observance and the need
and desire to carry on a normal public life. This point is inevitably
one of the more troubling realities, for the idea of de facto relegation
of some Muslim women to a life of confinement seems untenable.
Nonetheless, given the hypothetical situation, the Court must nec-
essarily balance the compelling governmental interest with consider-
ation of the many private arenas in which the burqa may flourish.
IV. GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES
Given the above analysis, the public facial concealment legis-
lation is constitutional in regards to the Free Exercise Clause. Of
course, the mere fact that legislation is constitutional does not make
it prudent, nor dampen its global unpopularity. Whether faced with
long-range or uncertain threats, any legislation banning the wearing
of the burqa will likely provoke international outrage and encourage
terrorist attacks from Islamic extremists. Furthermore, some may
argue that such legislation will hinder American efforts to bolster
international diplomacy and disseminate American democratic ideals.
These conclusions are valid in light of the fallout from France’s pas-
sage and affirmation of Act No. 2010-1192.
After France’s 2004 legislation banning Islamic head-scarves
in state schools, principal deputy to Osama bin Laden, Dr. Ayman
al-Zawahiri, criticized France, stating “France, the country of lib-
erty, . . . defends only the liberty of nudity, debauchery and decay,
while fighting chastity and modesty.”199 Al-Zawahiri further as-
serted that “[t]he decision of the French president [Jacques Chirac]
to issue a law to prevent Muslim girls from covering their heads
199. Neil MacFarquhar, A Top Bin Laden Aide Threatens New Attacks Against the
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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in schools is another example of the Crusader and envy that the
Westerners have against Muslims.” 200
At the highest levels of al-Qaeda, now-deceased Osama bin Laden
weighed in via a videotape that surfaced on October 27, 2010.201 Bin
Laden reacted to France’s finalizing burqa legislation with the follow-
ing statement: “Since you have acted tyrannically, believing that you
have the right to prevent free-born women from wearing the veil,
don’t we have the right to expel your invading men by slicing their
necks?”202 Some critics of this Note’s proposed legislation may argue
that it abandons the American tradition of vibrant religious exercise,
and ultimately provides fuel for such extremist tirades—precisely
what President Obama and his national security team hoped to avoid,
as articulated in the President’s 2010 National Security Strategy.203
Along with recognizing the need for an active national security
apparatus, President Obama articulated the Nation’s commitment
to recognizing civil liberties.204 Furthermore, the President’s strat-
egy emphasizes diversity and inclusion as a means to combat extrem-
ist ideologies both domestically and internationally.205
The vast array of considerations are overwhelming, but the
consequences of inaction would include further carnage and terror.
Despite the likely domestic and international furor that would re-
sult from the hypothetical legislation, the government may be con-
fident in its utmost compelling interest and that it achieves said
200. Probable Al Qaeda Tapes Warn of More Attacks, CNN.COM (Feb. 25, 2004,
6:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/02/24/qaeda.tapes/ (alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. Jonathan Laurence & Justin Vaïsse, Bin Laden’s Backfire, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/01/bin_laden_s_backfire.
202. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
203. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 36 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
[T]he power of America’s example has helped spread freedom and de-
mocracy abroad. That is why we must always seek to uphold these values
not just when it is easy, but when it is hard. Advancing our interests may
involve new arrangements to confront threats like terrorism, but these prac-
tices and structures must always be in line with our Constitution, preserve
our people’s privacy and civil liberties, and withstand the checks and
balances that have served us so well.
Id. (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 37 (“Protecting civil liberties and privacy are integral to the vibrancy of our
democracy and the exercise of freedom. We are balancing our solemn commitments to
these virtues with the mandate to provide security for the American people.”).
205. Id. (“Within our own communities, those who seek to recruit and radicalize
individuals will often try to prey upon isolation and alienation. Our own commitment to
extending the promise of America will both draw a contrast with those who try to drive
people apart, while countering attempts to enlist individuals in ideological, religious, or
ethnic extremism.”).
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interest in the least restrictive means. If America were to success-
fully convince the international community of the legislation’s legal
soundness, it may be best to articulate the government’s case within
the RFRA’s confines—namely, that the law is necessary in the face
of a grave threat and that the law is pursued through the least re-
strictive means. In addition, resources should be allocated to mount a
vast public education campaign to clarify that, first, wearing a burqa
as religious exercise can still flourish in houses of worship and the pri-
vate sphere; second, the legislation is not a war on Islam; and third,
the threat surely does not solely originate from adherents of Islam.
CONCLUSION
The proposals presented in this Note call for difficult choices and
sacrifices by the government, the judiciary, and most importantly, the
American people. Even discussing many of these issues seems anti-
thetical to the values of inclusiveness and freedom to which we cling.
Nonetheless, the government’s interest in protecting its citizens and
maintaining its own existence is the ultimate compelling interest.
Considering the merits of the government’s compelling interest in
national security, the ability of the burqa to flourish in private
and religious spaces, and the burqa’s functional inability to defer to
the government’s interest, the proposed legislation, as an unlikely
current prospect, is a viable constitutional measure should such a
grisly hypothetical come to fruition within our borders.
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